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Abstract
The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) has long been known for its moderate, pluralist 
theology. However, many grassroot NU clerics and activists do not pay attention 
to these pluralist teachings. Instead, they carried out attacks and religious 
persecutions against religious minorities such as the Ahmadi and Shi’ite 
communities in Indonesia. It is puzzling to see a big contradiction between 
the pluralist theological beliefs articulated by some of  NU’s senior clerics and 
the religiously intolerant actions conducted by many of  its clerics and activists 
against religious minorities at a grassroot level. Using insights from social 
movement theory, this article argues that the roots of  such contradictions can 
be traced back to NU’s organizational structure, which is decentralized and 
leave ultimate theological authority with local clerics who run their own Islamic 
boarding schools (pesantren) and issue their own theological interpretations 
and rulings (fatwa) that are being obeyed by their students and followers. 
[NU telah lama dikenal berteologi moderat dan pluralis. Meskipun demikian, 
ulama dan aktifis akar rumput kurang memperhatikan ajaran pluralis 
1 This paper was presented at International Conference on Growing Religious 
Intolerance in Indonesia: Outlook, Challenges, and Future Trajectory of  Indonesian Religious 
Life initiative by Rajaratnam School of  International Studies (RSIS), Singapore and 
Pascasarjana UIN Sunan Kalijaga, in Yogyakarta on 24-25 September 2015.
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tersebut. Bahkan sebagian dari mereka justru terlibat dalam penyerangan dan 
persekusi kelompok minoritas seperti Ahmadiyah dan Shiah di Indonesia. Hal 
ini cukup membingungkan dan kontradiktif  antara artikulasi pemikiran 
pluralis tokoh senior NU dengan tindakan intoleran yang dilakukan pengikut 
NU di level akar rumput. Dengan pendekatan teori gerakan sosial, artikel 
ini menjelaskan kontradiksi tersebut dengan melacak akarnya pada struktur 
organisasi NU yang terdesentralisasi dan otoritas teologi berbasis ulama 
lokal yang mempunyai pesantren dan interpretasi keagamaannya sendiri yang 
dipatuhi oleh santri dan pengikutnya.]
Keywords: Nahdlatul Ulama, social movement, religious intolerance, 
Indonesia 
A. Introduction
Religious intolerance has become an increasing concern in post-
Reformasi Indonesia, as incidents of  violence and persecution against 
religious minority groups in Indonesia have increased within the past 
decade. During this period, incidents of  intolerance against religious 
minorities have affected members of  the Ahmaddiya community, 
Shiite Muslims, and Christians. The persistence of  religious intolerance 
incidents occurring over the past decade and the lack of  willingness by 
both national and subnational governments to resolve the problem have 
seriously tarnished Indonesia’s human rights records and international 
reputation as a consolidated democratic country.2 
Some of  the most troubling incidents of  religious intolerance were 
directed against two notable Muslim minorities: the Ahmadis, originally 
brought to Indonesia from Pakistan during the 1920s by followers of  
its founder (and self-proclaimed prophet) Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, and 
Shiite Islam, which in contemporary times are being brought to Indonesia 
by Iranian preachers and Indonesian clerics who studied in Iran. Due 
to the Ahmadi community’s belief  that their founder was a prophet, in 
contradiction to the Islamic teaching that there can be no new prophet 
2 International human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch have cited intolerance incidents against religious minorities and 
the Indonesian state’s failure to protect them from persecutions as a rationale for the 
poor human rights records ratings for Indonesia in the post-Reformasi period.
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after the death of  Prophet Muhammad, the Ahmadi community has been 
targeted with persecutions and violent attacks against their mosques and 
settlements in the past few decades. In Pakistan, the Ahmadis have been 
considered a heretical sect since 1960, and they have been classified as 
a “non-Islamic” religion since 1970, in spite of  its followers’ insistence 
that given its theological roots and beliefs in the basic Islamic creeds, 
the Ahmadis are Muslims as well. As a result, the Ahmadis were targeted 
for numerous violent attacks both in Pakistan as well as in other Muslim 
countries such as Malaysia. 
Shiism has been involved in violent conflicts with the mainstream 
Sunni community within Islam ever since the foundation of  the religion 
in the seventh century. This conflict originated with the dispute on 
whether the successors of  the Prophet Muhammad should come from 
the descendants of  Imam Ali bin Ibn Thalib or whether it can come from 
any Muslims of  good will. This dispute, which then was transformed 
to conflicts over other aspects of  traditions, rituals, and authority, has 
sadly continued to this day, where Sunni-Shiite disputes can be seen in 
the ongoing violent conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as in 
periodic communal strifes in Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, and numerous other 
countries. However, in Indonesia, for decades Shiism was tolerated, if  
not accepted by most mainstream Islamic groups, including the country’s 
two largest Muslim-majority organization, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 
and Muhammadiyah, to be a legitimate Islamic sect.3 It was only after 
Indonesia underwent an Islamic revival during the 1990s and 2000s, 
and numerous conservative, Salafi-oriented new Islamic movements 
emerged,4 that this recognition was thrown into question, after these 
new movements began to gain power and influence within the country’s 
public sphere. 
Within the past decade, several notable incidents involving the 
violent persecutions against Indonesian Ahmaddis and Shiite members 
have occurred, including those in West Lombok on 19 October 2005 and 
3 This was affirmed by senior NU leaders such as Abdurrahman Wahid, the 
organization’s former chairman (1984-1999) and Said Aqil Siradj, its current chairman 
(2010-present). 
4 Such groups include the Muslim Brotherhood’s inspired Justice and 
Development Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera – PKS) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). 
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in Cikeusik, Banten on 6 February 2011 against the Ahmadi Community, 
and the 12 August 2012 attack on the Shi’a community in Sampang, 
Madura. These violent incidents were encouraged by the actions of  
religious authorities, such as the 2005 fatwa of  the Indonesian Ulama 
Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) which reaffirms its 1980 fatwa 
which declared Indonesian Ahmadis as a deviant sect prohibited them 
to proselytize their faith to outsiders. State actions taken to enforce the 
MUI fatwa, most importantly the June 2008 Surat Keputusan Bersama 
(Joint Ministerial Decree - SKB) issued by the Ministry of  Home Affairs, 
Ministry of  Religious Affairs, and Attorney General’s Office which 
declared Ahmadiyah to be a deviant sect and prohibited its members to 
proselytize their faith to outsiders, is also cited as official regulations that 
encouraged violence and persecutions to be committed against known 
Ahmadi members throughout Indonesia. 
When one looks at the groups responsible for provoking these acts 
of  violence against the two Muslim minorities, what is striking is the fact 
that they were not initiated by the usual suspects- radical Islamic groups 
such as Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front, FPI) or Laskar 
Jihad. Instead, they were staged by local clerics, their pupils within the 
Islamic boarding schools (pesantrens) that they founded, and the rank-
and-file public who worshipped at their mosques. Often, the clerics 
were affiliated with Indonesia’s largest Muslim-majority organization, 
the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), an organization that was publicly known for 
their advocacy of  tolerance and pluralism for religious minority groups 
and their adherents.5 
The fact that NU-affiliated clerics and their followers were the 
instigators of  incidents such as the Sampang incident against the Shiite 
and the Kuningan and West Lombok incidents against the Ahmadis, 
indicate that there is a contradiction between official NU theology 
advocated by its leaders, most famously by its long-term chairman the 
late Abdurrahman Wahid, and the religiously intolerant actions conducted 
5 Jeremy Menchik (2016) argues that NU’s toleration of  religious minorities is 
based on communal tolerance instead of  individual-level tolerance commonly practiced 
in Western countries. Under communal tolerance, some religious minorities are tolerated, 
but not others, depending on whether such groups are theologically compatible with 
fundamental Islamic beliefs or not. This is why it can tolerate Christians and Hindus, 
but not Muslim minority sects such as the Ahmadis. 
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by some of  its clerics and activists against religious minorities at the 
grassroots level. How can we explain this puzzle and understand why 
such contradictions take place? 
Using insights from new social movement (NSM) theory, this 
article argues that the roots of  such contradictions can be traced back to 
NU’s organizational structure, which is decentralized and leave ultimate 
theological authority with local clerics who run their own Islamic boarding 
(pesantren) schools and issue their own theological interpretations and 
rulings (fatwa) to be obeyed by their students and followers. As a result, the 
opinions and rulings of  the NU Central Board are not always followed by 
rank-and-file clerics. Consequently, unlike more hierarchical Indonesian 
Islamic organizations (i.e., the Muhammadiyah), NU leadership board 
has no institutional mechanisms in place to discipline these clerics and 
force them to accept the rulings it has issued. 
After a brief  review of  social movement theory (especially the 
NSM paradigm), and how it relates to NU’s decentralised organizational 
structure, this article tests this argument by comparing the tolerant 
theological teachings of  prominent NU clerics such as Abdurrahman 
Wahid and Mustofa Bisri (Gus Mus), with the actual practices in Sampang 
and West Lombok during the time violent persecutions against Shiite 
and Ahmadi minorities living in these areas occurred. The data from 
newspaper and online accounts of  the incidents is further enriched with 
first-hand data collected from the interviews with NU clerics and activists 
from the author’s dissertation fieldwork in Indonesia, as well as from 
his subsequent research. The article finds sufficient evidence to affirm 
the argument and find that the religious intolerance actions committed 
by NU members have greatly tarnished the reputation of  the NU as a 
moderate and inclusivist organization. The article concludes with some 
recommendations to prevent religious intolerance incidents by NU clerics 
and activists in the future. 
B. Theoretical Framework
One of  the most widely used framework in the social sciences to 
explain how the structure of  different social organizations are shaping 
their internal decision-making and the effectiveness of  their policy 
strategies is social movement theory. Social movement theory has become 
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a large body of  work seeking to explain the rising importance of  civil 
society organizations (CSOs) with goals to advocate a given political 
change advocated by these groups. Social movement theory contains three 
main concepts: political opportunity structure, resource mobilization, 
and framing. Political opportunity structure is the availability political space 
(usually measured as an open public sphere in a democratic polity) for 
the movement to enable it to effectively carry out its advocacy. Resource 
mobilization is the ability of  the organization to secure and utilize resources, 
both political and material, that enable it to carry out its advocacy 
campaign effectively, while framing is the rhetorics and narratives used by 
the organization to promote the causes it advocates. While opportunity 
structure and resource mobilization are structural-based determinants 
of  a social movement’s political actions and their successes and failures, 
framing is agent-based and can be utilized with little regard to the 
existing socio-political structure. It is widely utilized by the New Social 
Movements (NSM) paradigm that rose in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
to challenge the hegemony of  the more structure-oriented, rationalist, 
resource mobilization school.6 
Unlike its predecessors, which assume a coherent and unilateral 
social movement run by a group of  activists who shares a similar set of  
goals, NSM theorists believe that a social movement can consist of  “a 
plurality of  groups, interests, and orientations, that can conflict or be in 
tension with one another”.7 They believe that scholars should reveal “the 
existence of  plurality, conflict, and tension in collective action” as well 
as how these conditions help to structure “the gestalt of  contemporary 
6 Unlike resource mobilization theory, NSM theorists argue that social 
movements are not necessarily cohesive and coherent political actors with rationally 
calculated goals. Instead, they can consist of  multiple actors with few things in common 
except for their goal to seek change in a political problem (e.g., democratization, 
environmental protection, etc.). NSM advocates also argue that unlike earlier social 
movement theorists who argue that social movements have a material-based goals and 
always seek to be incorporated into formal political process (e.g., labour movements), 
instead the goals of  social movements can be primarily ideational (e.g., environment, 
gender and racial equality) and often prefer to stay out of  formal political process 
altogether. 
7 Alberto Melucci, Nomads of  the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in 
Contemporary Society, ed. by John Keane and Paul Mier (London: Hutchinson Radius, 
1989), p. 351.
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social movements and their composite groups”.8 Based on these, a social 
movement is no longer assumed to consist of  a group of  activists who 
share a common sets of  grievances against a social problem along with a 
common set of  remedies to resolve them, but as a complex organization 
consisting of  individual activists who can have different sets of  goals and 
priorities and often disagree with one another on the best way to obtain 
them, while remaining members of  a specific movement.
Scholars such as Gamson and Tarrow have differentiated social 
movements into two subgroups based on their organizational structures: 
centralized and decentralized organizations.9 The former is characterized 
with a more coherent leadership hierarchy and decision-making structure. 
While such movements are able to issue decisions that have been carefully 
vetted and discussed by the leadership, and also have a better coordination 
between its hierarchy and rank-and-file members, centralized influence 
key decisions or acts in the name of  the organization. They also tend to 
be more bureaucratic, which can creates longer time lags for decisions 
to be made.
On the other hand, decentralized organizations often consists 
of  “a great variety of  localized groups or cells which are essentially 
independent, but which can combine to form larger configurations or 
divide to form smaller units.”10 Their lack of  hierarchical structure enables 
rank-and-file members to have more authority over policy decisions, and 
in some cases, they can often act in the name of  the organization without 
prior approval from its hierarchy. It is also often faster to discern and 
disseminate new ideas within decentralized organizations than centralized 
ones, as there are fewer ‘gatekeepers’ who can prevent the idea from 
being disseminated within the organization. Decentralized movements 
structure is also beneficial for groups operating under more repressive 
political environment, as it would not be easier for an authoritarian 
government to completely suspend their political activities. However, as 
predicted by the NSM theory, decentralized organization tend to have less 
8 Greg Martin, Understanding Social Movements (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 7.
9 William A. Gamson, The Strategy of  Social Protest (Homewood, Ill: The Dorsey 
Press, 1975); Sidney G. Tarrow, Power Movement Social Movements and Contentious Politics 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
10 Tarrow, Power Movement Social Movements and Contentious Politics, p. 130.
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cohesion compared to the more centralized ones, as internal disputes and 
disagreements from within the organization on certain ideas and policies 
can easily be developed and not contained from within. As a result, 
different factions from the same organization can have contradictory 
positions that differ from one another regarding a particular issue the 
organization is trying to address.
The NU is an example of  a decentralized social movement/civil 
society organization, as while the organization has a central leadership 
board (Tanfidziyah) and central advisory board (Syuriah) that are mandated 
by the organization’s by-laws to be the ultimate decision making bodies 
for the organization, the organization neither controls nor funds its 
approximately 18,000 strong Islamic schools (pesantren), universities, and 
other social services institutions. Instead, these institutions were founded, 
operated, and funded by individual NU clerics (kyai) who declared 
themselves to be affiliated with the NU. These kyai held ultimate decision-
making authority within their own pesantren, binding their students 
(santri) and local community members to the legal opinion (fatwa) and 
other religious directives they issued –including those concerning which 
candidates to support in national and local elections. Since authority 
rests on individual kyais instead of  the NU central leadership board, the 
former often issue fatwa and other rulings that are contradicting, even 
conflicting, those issued by the latter. As a result, decisions issued by 
senior clerics who sat in the leadership board are often contradicted by 
individual kyais at the grassroots level. Sometimes these decisions are 
completely ignored by the latter. 
C. NU’s Pluralist Theology as Articulated by Its Top Leaders
This contradiction between the theological rulings issued by the 
NU leadership and those held by rank-and-file kyais and their followers 
can be seen in the conflicting viewpoints regarding the issue of  religious 
tolerance and pluralism within the organization. Over the past three 
decades, the NU leadership has strongly support a more tolerant and 
inclusive interpretation of  Islam in its relationships with other religious 
groups in Indonesia. This can be clearly seen from the theological 
statements made by the late Abdurrahman Wahid, NU’s long-term 
chairman (1984-1999) and a former Indonesian President (1999-2001). 
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Wahid was known to be a strong supporter for Indonesia’s inclusivist 
ideology Pancasila, based on his belief  that the national ideology is the 
best mechanism to protect and guarantee the religious freedom of  
Indonesia’s minority religions. While 88 percent of  Indonesian population 
are Muslims, there are a number of  sizable religious minorities living 
in Indonesia as well: Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucians. 
The Indonesian Muslim community is also divided among traditionalist 
NU, modernist Muhammadiyah, conservative, Salafi-influenced Islamic 
groups, and numerous small Islamic minority sects such as the Ahmadis 
and the Shiite. This extraordinary religious diversity necessitates the need 
for a secular state, since it is the only one that would unite all members 
of  these religious traditions under a single nation-state.11 
Wahid argues that Pancasila reflects the religious plurality of  the 
Indonesian people and ensures that members of  these different religious 
traditions would be able to practice religious tolerance with one another.12 
More importantly, Pancasila recognizes the validity of  theological 
revelations of  each religious tradition and serves as the legal foundation 
for the state to guarantee and protect the religious freedom of  all religions, 
particularly those of  religious minorities. Under Pancasila, “all religions 
receive equal status before the law and receive the same legal protection 
from the state.”13 Should Pancasila be replaced as Indonesia’s national 
ideology with the shari‘a, Wahid believes that it will result in sectarianism 
that will privileges Muslims (specifically revivalist Muslims) over other 
religious traditions within the Indonesian society. Thus, Wahid rejects 
an Islamic state because:
….our nation is very heterogeneous in their way of  life, thus the state 
could not only serve the interests of  Muslims alone. Many Indonesian 
Muslims, myself  included, have rejected the Islamic state in Indonesia. 
Their beliefs and opinions, along with those of  Indonesians who are not 
Muslims (more than 10 percent of  Indonesia’s population), should be 
respected. It is foolish to assume that the concept of  an Islamic state is 
accepted by all Muslims in this country, just because Islam is the majority 
11 Abdurrahman Wahid, “NU dan Negara Islam”, in Islamku, Islam Anda, Islam 
Kita: Agama, Masyarakat dan Negara Demokrasi (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 2006), pp. 100–5.
12 Nur Khalik Ridwan, Gus Dur dan Negara Pancasila (Yogyakarta: Tanah Air, 
2010), pp. 31–2.
13 Ibid., p. 32.
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religion in Indonesia.14 
To preserve the climate that supports inter-religious tolerance 
and pluralism, Wahid argues that Muslims should engage in continuous 
dialogue among themselves, with non-Islamic religions, and with the 
greater human community. He cites a teaching issued by his mentor the 
late Achmad Siddiq, arguing that NU members should practice three 
forms of  ‘ecumenic dialogue’ (ukhuwwah) with other religious groups: 1) 
dialogue with fellow Muslims, especially with Muhammadiyah members 
(ukhuwwah Islamiyah); 2) dialogue with all Indonesians, especially with 
non-Muslims (ukhuwwah wathaniyah); and 3) dialogue with the rest of  
humanity, to promote common values such as world peace, human rights, 
and environmental protection (ukhuwwah basyariyyah).15 
Said Aqil Siradj, the current NU chairman, has stated that the NU 
will continue to promote religious dialogue with non-Muslim religions as 
part of  its promotion of  Islam as rahmatan lil alamin which is “tolerant, 
opposes religious exclusivism and separatism, and recognizes the religious 
plurality and diversity within the Indonesian society.”16 He condemned 
recent attacks against minority Islamic sects at the hand of  revivalist-
leaning organizations, such as the Ahmadiyah and Shiite minority sects, 
and has pledged that his organization will continue to condemn violent 
acts against religious minorities.17 Regarding Ahmaddiyah, Said Aqil stated 
that while he considers it as a deviant Islamic sect, he argues that it should 
14 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Islam: Ideologis ataukah Kultural?”, in Islamku, Islam 
Anda, Islam Kita: Agama, Masyarakat dan Negara Demokrasi (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 
2006), pp. 50–3.
15 Martin van Bruinessen, “Traditions for the Future: The Reconstruction of  
Traditionalist Discourse within NU”, in Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity 
in Indonesia, ed. by Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (Clayton, Vic: Monash Asia Institute, 
Monash University, 1996), pp. 163–89.
16 “Presiden Puji NU Tegakkan Pluralisme” (18 Jul 2011), http://test.
cathnewsindonesia.com/2011/07/18/presiden-puji-nu-tegakkan-pluralisme/, accessed 
5 Feb 2012.
17 “KH Said Aqil Siradj: Jangan Ragu Dengan PBNU”, The Wahid Institute 
(22 Mar 2011), http://www.wahidinstitute.org/v1/News/Detail/?id=295/hl=id/
KH_Said_Aqil_Siradj_Jangan_Ragu_Dengan_PBNU, accessed 5 Feb 2012; “Said Aqil: 
Syiah Tidak Sesat” (27 Jan 2012), https://nasional.tempo.co/read/379960/said-aqil-
syiah-tidak-sesat, accessed 5 Feb 2012.
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not be dealt with using violence, as he argues that Ahmadiyah members 
are “full fledged Indonesian citizens which should be respected, protected 
and possess the same rights and responsibilities as any other Indonesian 
citizens.”18 As Indonesian Ahmadis are also citizens, Said Aqil states that:
...there are our brothers with the same status and rights as any other 
citizens that we all should respect. This is ukhuwah wathaniyah (dialogue 
with fellow citizens) within the NU. What is important is that they are 
not breaking any laws.19  
Regarding the Shiite minority, Said Aqil has repeatedly declared that 
Shiism “is not a deviant sect and is a member of  the Islamic community 
just like the mainstream Sunni majority.”20 This is strengthening by a 
2006 NU fatwa which states that Shiism is not a deviant sect. Said Aqil 
elaborates that within Sunni and Shia there are so many schools of  
thoughts, which indicates the wide range of  theological diversity within 
Islam, but it is not something that should be condemned, but instead, 
“it is something that needs to be responded through dialogue (ukhuwah) 
and toleration.”21
Former NU supreme leader (rais aam) Kyai Haji Mustofa Bisri, also 
have condemned acts of  violence against members of  Ahmadi and Shiite 
minorities In regard to the Ahmadis, Bisri responded that:
The proper NU path to deal with a deviant sect is through peaceful dialogue 
to bring them to return to the right path, not through condemnations 
or through the use of  physical violence. Anyone who resorts to violence 
[against members of  the Ahmadis Sect] do not follow the NU path 
Instead, an NU follower must approach them through the principles of  
neutrality (tawassuth), tolerance (tasamuh), and balance (tawasun).22  
18 Pribadi Wicaksono, “NU: Ahmadiyah Menyimpang, Tapi Tak Boleh Dikerasi”, 
Tempo.co, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/323143/nu-ahmadiyah-menyimpang-tapi-tak-
boleh-dikerasi, accessed 14 Dec 2015.
19 Solichan Arif, “Ketum PBNU: Ahmadiyah Saudara dan Patut Dihormati” 
(14 Nov 2013), https://news.okezone.com/read/2013/11/14/337/897151/ketum-
pbnu-ahmadiyah-saudara-dan-patut-dihormati, accessed 14 Dec 2015.
20 “Said Aqil: Syiah Tidak Sesat”.
21 Ibid.
22 “Gus Mus: Jangan Gunakan Kekerasan pada Ahmadiyah”, NU Online, 
https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/12105/gus-mus-jangan-gunakan-kekerasan-pada-
ahmadiyah, accessed 14 Dec 2015.
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Bisri added that the great NU ulama of  the past century all have 
considered Ahmadis to be a deviant sect. However, they allowed the 
sect to co-exist with the NU community. This is because these ulama 
“were following the path of  the Prophet Muhammad (blessed are his 
name) who are wise in responding to differences [within the Muslim 
community].”23 Lastly, Bisri condemns the violence against members of  
the Ahmadi community, stating that: “This is not about religious beliefs, 
but is about committing violence against. We cannot allow certain folks 
to play God and condemn their fellow mankind,” alluding to the alleged 
involvement of  radical Islamic groups such as Front Pembela Islam (Islamic 
Defenders Front, FPI), in inciting violence against Ahmadis, Shiite, and 
other religious minority groups in Indonesia.24
 Even more conservative senior NU ulama such as Kyai Haji 
Sholahuddin Wahid (Abdurrahman Wahid’s younger brother) have 
condemned acts of  violence against members of  Indonesian Ahmadi 
community. He stated that, 
The Indonesian Police must act swiftly against anyone who tried to destroy 
the praying facilities and assets that belongs to the Ahmadi community. 
It is important to do so, in order to prevent Ahmadi members to feel 
uncomfortable living in this country.25
Hence, we can conclude that there is a consensus within the NU 
senior ulama regarding the need of  the NU community to tolerate 
members of  religious minorities, including Muslim-minority sects, to 
engage in peaceful dialogue with them, and to condemn any violent acts 
against religious minorities. NU’s long-standing principles of  neutrality 
(tawassuth), tolerance (tasamuh), and balance (tawasun) that have been 
revived by reformers such as Abdurrahman Wahid during the 1980s 
are being reinterpreted to justify the organization’s tolerant actions for 
23 Arie Yoenianto, “Gus Mus: Jangan Habisi Ahmadiyah” (12 Feb 2011), 
https://news.okezone.com/read/2011/02/12/337/424215/gus-mus-jangan-habisi-
ahmadiyah, accessed 14 Dec 2015.
24 “Gus Mus: Tindak Tegas Pelaku Kekerasan”, NU Online, http://www.nu.or.
id/post/read/26716/gus-mus-tindak-tegas-pelaku-kekerasan, accessed 14 Dec 2015.
25 “Gus Sholah: Jangan Sampai Pengikut Ahmadiyah Tak Aman di Indonesia”, 
NU Online, https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/12066/gus-sholah-jangan-sampai-
pengikut-ahmadiyah-tak-aman-di-indonesia, accessed 14 Dec 2015.
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religious minorities in light of  increasing religious diversity in Indonesia. 
Members of  the NU central leadership (PBNU) and its senior ulama, have 
affirmed these principles to condemn acts of  intolerance and violence 
against Muslim-minority sects. 
Hence, it is puzzling to see that at grassroots level, violent actions 
against these sects are still being committed, often by local ulama who 
affiliated themselves with the NU. The following section details some of  
these violent actions and the involvement of  local NU communities in 
them, in order to explain the discrepancies between the tolerant theology 
promoted by NU leadership and the intolerant and violent acts committed 
by local NU ulama and followers against Muslim-minority sects against 
the Ahmadis and the Shiites. 
D. NU Local Branches’ Intolerant Actions
As pointed out in an earlier section, violence against Ahmadi and 
Shiite communities throughout Indonesia escalated since the 2000s. 
Acts of  violence against the Ahmadis have increased in response to 
the MUI’s 2005 fatwa which reaffirmed the organization’s 1980 ruling 
which declared that the Ahmadis is a deviant Islamic sect that should 
be prohibited throughout Indonesia and to the joint declaration of  the 
Ministries of  Home Affairs, Religious Affairs, and Law and Human 
Rights of  June 2008. Since 2005, violence incidents against the Ahmadi 
community in Indonesia had occured in Kampus Mubarok, Parung (July 
2005), Cianjur, West Java (September 2005), West Lombok (October 
2005), Central Lombok (February 2006), Kuningan, West Java (December 
2007), and Cikeusik, Banten (February 2011).26 Meanwhile, the most 
significant attack against the Shiite community in Sampang, East Java, 
in December 2011, although there were earlier attacks against Shiite 
26 Erni Budiwanti, “Pluralism Collapses: A Study of  the Jama’ah Ahmadiyah 
Indonesia and its Persecution”, Working Paper, no. 117 (Singapore: NUS, 2009), p. 18, 
https://ari.nus.edu.sg/Publication/Detail/1370, accessed 18 Dec 2015; Robin Bush 
and Budhy Munawar-Rachman, “NU and Muhammadiyah: Majority Views on Religious 
Minorities in Indonesia”, in Religious Diversity in Muslim-majority States in Southeast Asia: 
Areas of  Toleration and Conflict, ed. by Bernhard Platzdasch and Johan Saravanamuttu 
(Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof  Ishak Institute, 2014), p. 28.
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communities in Pasuruan and Bondowoso, East Java, as well.27 
The increasing violent incidents against members of  Ahmadis 
and Shiite minorities have been attributed to both the more exclusivist 
legal actions of  the MUI and the Indonesian Government against both 
groups and the rise of  more conservative. Salafi-oriented Islamic groups 
that have openly threatened violence against the two groups, such as the 
FPI, Forum Ummat Islam (Forum of  Islamic Ummah - FUI), and Lembaga 
Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam (Institute of  Islamic Research and Study 
- LPPI).28 However, many of  the actual perpetrators of  these incidents 
were local-level ulama and their followers from mainstream Islamic 
organizations, notably the NU. 
For instance, it is widely believed that violent persecutions of  
Ahmadis in West Lombok in 2005 were instigated by local Islamic clerics 
of  West Nusa Tenggara (Tuan Guru), who interpreted and preached about 
the MUI fatwa against the Ahmadis to their local communities. As these 
Tuan Gurus were considered to be ultimate figures of  authority for local 
Muslims, their provocative and angry sermons against the Ahmadis and 
their call for the faithful ummah to enforce the MUI fatwa were widely 
attributed as a primary motivator for the mass violent actions against 
the Ahmadi community in West Lombok.29 As most Tuan Gurus and 
their pesantrens in West Nusa Tenggara were affiliated with the NU, one 
cannot help but conclude that it was the local NU affiliates within the 
West Nusa Tenggara province who were responsible for the violence and 
persecutions against the Ahmaddis within the province. 
The same phenomena can also be seen in the actions of  the local 
branch of  the NU in Kuningan, West Java, when violence against the 
Ahmadis erupted in December 2007. The local NU board (Pimpinan 
Cabang Nahdlatul Ulama - PCNU) ignored the official position of  PBNU 
for NU members not to commit acts of  violence against the Ahmadis, but 
instead were involved in provoking and participating in the attacks against 
27 Bush and Munawar-Rachman, “NU and Muhammadiyah: Majority Views 
on Religious Minorities in Indonesia”, p. 30.
28 Erni Budiwanti, Pluralism Collapses: A Study of  the Jama’ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia 
and its Persecution, pp. 15–6.
29 Ibid., p. 17.
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the Ahmadi mosque and settlement within their district.30 Meanwhile, 
violence against the Shiite community in Sampang were precipitated by 
the joint fatwa of  the Sampang MUI and NU district branches which 
declared that Shiism is a deviant sect and that any acts of  violence 
against Shiite followers were not caused by “radical Sunnis” but by acts 
of  “defamation against religion” conducted by the local Shiite leader, 
Ustadz Tajul Muluk.31 This declaration was issued in spite of  the official 
position of  the national MUI, as articulated by its then Deputy Chairman, 
Ma’ruf  Amin, and those of  the NU as declared by its Chairman Said Aqil 
Siradj, that Shiism is not considered to be a deviant sect, but instead is 
a “bonafide” member of  the Muslim community.32
Local NU branches continued to defy the official position of  
the PBNU after these violent incidents have been committed. PCNU 
Kuningan ignored the pleas made by the PBNU to recant their support 
for the violent actions against the Ahmadis of  Kuningan that PBNU had 
to reprimand the PCNU Kuningan Head Kiai Haji Mahmud Silahuddin.33 
In the aftermath of  the Sampang incident against the Shiites, the PCNU 
of  Eastern Java issued their own fatwa declaring that Shiism is a deviant 
sect. Habib Achmad Zein Alkaf, head of  Eastern Java PCNU’s Syuriah 
(religious council) which was responsible for the issuance of  fatwa on 
behalf  of  the organisation’s East Java chapter, condemned NU Chairman’s 
Said Aqil’s defense of  the Shiites and accusing him of  “betraying the 
NU.”34 Lastly, the then chairman of  the West Nusa Tenggara MUI board 
(whom was also a NU cleric) declared that:
We do not need to have dialogue and conversation with the local Ahmadis 
because government’s joint decree and the MUI fatwa have clarified 
their status [as a deviant sect]. Hence, there is no further communication 
between MUI and the Ahmadiyyah Jama’ah.35 
30 Bush and Munawar-Rachman, “NU and Muhammadiyah: Majority Views 
on Religious Minorities in Indonesia”, p. 29.
31 Ibid., p. 30.
32 Ibid., p. 31.
33 Ibid., p. 29.
34 Ibid., p. 31.
35 Mohammad Asyiq Amrulloh, Mustain, and Atun Wardatun, “Dampak Sosial 
Kekerasan Terhadap Jemaat Ahmadiyah di Lombok dan Upaya Resolusi Konflik”, Jurnal 
Penelitian Keislaman, vol. 6, no. 2 (2010).
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There are strong indications that beyond theological and legal 
justifications declaring both Ahmadis and Shiite to be a deviant sect, local 
violence against members of  both communities were also motivated by 
competition for mosque memberships and pesantren studentships between 
leaders of  these sects and local NU clerics. This can be seen clearly in 
the case of  Sampang, where the leader of  the local Shiite community, 
Uztadz Tajul Muluk, was considered by many to be a leader with strong 
charismatic attributes who widely gained popularity during his da’wah 
(preaching) activities and is increasingly attracting young pupils to join 
his pesantren:
In the case of  Sampang, the Shi’ite leader [Tajul Muluk] was someone 
with a rising reputation within the local community, while the local NU 
ulama (kyais) reputation andfollowing were in decline. Hence, the kyais 
joined forces and rallied their followers to burn the Shi’ite mosque and 
settlement in the area.36 
In West Lombok, there were also indications that the local ulama 
(Tuan Gurus) were also threatened by the preaching activities of  the 
local Ahmadi clerics, who were persuading some local youths to join 
their pesantren schools. As a result, the attacks against the local Ahmadi 
community were not only directed to target their housing settlements, but 
also their mosques, pesantrens, and orphanages, which were considered 
to be the centre for the Ahmadis to try preaching their beliefs to the 
local community.37 These attacks were justified by the clerics as an act of  
holy war (jihad) against ‘enemies of  the faith’ (musuh akidah) conducted 
by the ‘true Muslims’ [led by the Tuan Gurus] to defend their faith (bela 
agama) from the Ahmadi ‘heretics.’38
However, while local-level competition between local NU clerics 
and members of  the Ahmadi and Shiite minorities helped to drive 
violent persecutions against these minorities, international geo-politics 
is also used by some clerics as justifications for the NU to restrict the 
activities of  these groups in Indonesia. This is especially directed against 
Shiites, which are currently engaged in conflict with the Sunni groups in 
36 Interview with Ahmad Suaedy, Depok, West Java, 29 October 2015.
37 Erni Budiwanti, Pluralism Collapses: A Study of  the Jama’ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia 
and its Persecution, p. 17.
38 Ibid.
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numerous Middle Eastern countries. For instance, the Deputy Head of  
the Pesantren Al Hikam II in Depok, West Java, stated that Shi’a activities 
in Indonesia needs to be limited because:
Currently Indonesia has become a ‘boxing arena’ between two powers: 
Saudi Arabia which advocates Wahhabism, and Iran which advocates 
Shiism. Both of  these theological streams are determined to provoke 
and destroy each other. In practice, anti-Shi’ite movements in Indonesia 
are often sponsored by the Wahhabis, while anti-Wahhabi movements 
are sponsored by the Shiites. Because of  this, the NU pesantrens must 
reinforce their Al Sunnah Wa Jamaah teachings to compete against both 
the Wahhabis and the Shiites.39 
Other NU activists also believe that the involvement of  local 
NU kyai and their followers in the Sampang incident against the 
Shiite community might be instigated by Middle Eastern-influenced 
conservative activists, as part of  a larger theological battle against Shiites:
There are certain segments within the Muslim community who sought to 
provoke and cleanse the Shiite community in Indonesia. Some of  them 
are funded by the Saudis, while others are supported by the intelligence 
service of  the Indonesian Army (TNI). There is little chance NU activists 
would suddenly turn against Shi’a on their own. If  they did so, it is because 
of  the Middle Eastern influence.40
Whether they are caused by theological, material, or geopolitical 
reasons, local NU members often perpetrated violent actions and 
persecutions against Ahmadi and Shiite communities, namely in West 
Lombok, Kuningan (West Java), and Sampang (East Java). As shown 
above, these action were often done in defiance of  the NU national 
leadership which have consistently promoted toleration and peaceful 
dialogue with members of  these minority sects and have condemned 
violent actions against them in all forms. As I shall argue in the following 
section, the discrepancy between the national and local NU policies 
toward Islamic minority sects need to be seen from the decentralised 
structure of  the organization, which empowers local NU branches to 
openly defy the organization’s national leadership and thus, can conduct 
punitive actions against these minorities with little fear of  effective 
39 Interview with Arif  Zamzori, Depok, West Java, 29 October 2015. 
40 Interview with Ahmad Suaedy, Depok, West Java, 29 October 2015. 
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sanctions from the national authorities. 
E. The NU as a Decentralised Organisation and Its Consequences
Despite the fact that the NU has a national leadership board 
(PBNU) a religious council (Syuriah), and local leadership board (PCNU) 
in each Indonesian provinces and districts/cities, the leadership does 
not actually own NU-affiliated pesantrens, universities, hospitals, clinics, 
and other social service agencies that are affiliated with the organisation. 
Actual ownership of  such institutions rest with the individual ulama 
(kyai) who founded the institutions, recruit students (santri) and staff  
members to run these institutions, and raise funds to finance them. In 
addition, there are numerous NU-affiliated NGOs, think tanks, and other 
civil society organisations, which are founded by NU activists, but are 
not formally affiliated with the organisation. These include prominent 
think tanks such as the Wahid Institute in Jakarta, Lembaga Kajian Islam 
dan Masyarakat (Institute for the Study of  Islam and Society - LKiS) 
in Yogyakarta, Averroes Institute in Malang, as well as other similar 
institutions in other Indonesian cities. 
As individual kyais normally founded the pesantren and recruit 
students and followers on their own, they gained autonomy and authority 
from local communities where they built their pesantren. While such an 
authority was indivually centered around the kyai, but it is not transferred 
into the local and national NU leadership board. As a result, observers 
consider the leadership boards not to have much power and authority 
for individual NU followers:
There is no effective structure within the NU, as existing organisational 
structures within the organisation are not really effective. NU’s on-the-
ground foundation is based upon a kyai in a given village (kampung). Local 
people follow the kyai, but not the NU leadership boards.41  
In an earlier time as a social movement which opposed Suharto’s 
New Order regime during the late 1980s and early 1990s, this decentralised 
structure of  the NU was beneficial for pro-democracy proponents within 
the organisation such as Abdurrahman Wahid and young activists within 
NU-linked NGOs and think tanks such as LKiS to spread their ideas on 
41 Interview with Ahmad Suaedy, Depok, West Java, 29 October 2015.
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democracy and religious tolerance within the NU, as it allows them space 
to operate relatively freely within the organisation while effectively evade 
possible reprisals from the Suharto regime and conservative ulama within 
the NU.42 However, in a democratic, post-Reformasi Indonesia, where 
numerous theological ideas from different streams and sources can be 
articulated freely within the public sphere, including among different NU 
kyai and followers, NU’s decentralised structure reveals its disadvantages, 
as it becomes difficult for NU leadership to clamp down on individual 
kyais different interpretations on religious matters, including on how to 
treat Muslim minorities such as the Ahmadis and the Shiites. 
Even though the NU claims up to 60 million Indonesian Muslims 
to be its followers, in practice, most of  these followers are following the 
kyais who voluntarily affiliated themselves and their pesantrens with the 
NU. Because these followers (jama’ah) are actually following the kyai, it 
becomes impossible for the NU leadership board to control them:
Only a small number of  NU jam’aah are actually registered as full-time 
members of  the organisation (jam’iyah). Most jam’aah follow the NU 
because they follow the same traditions and rituals their kyais are practicing 
(e.g., praying over the deceased (tahlilan), praying over the graves of  
deceased ulamas (ziarah kubur)). However, most of  them would never 
be active in NU’s daily activities. Hence, kyais become very crucial in 
preventing religious conflicts, as it is the kyai who bind together all of  
his followers.43 
Given the central role of  the kyai in determining the possible 
actions of  their jama’ah, including their behaviors toward religious 
minorities, their roles become very crucial in preventing religious conflict. 
However, this becomes problematic as the NU leadership board do not 
have much authority over most kyais:
The most effective ways to prevent intolerant and violent actions 
toward religious minorities is through the assistance of  kyais. However, 
organisationally the NU do not have control over these kyais, even though 
they are nominally NU jam’aah. It is more effective to influence the kyais 
through informal channels (e.g, senior kyais whom used to taught them) 
42 Bush and Munawar-Rachman, “NU and Muhammadiyah: Majority Views 
on Religious Minorities in Indonesia”, p. 37.
43 Interview with Rumadi Ahmad, Jakarta, 30 October 2015. 
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rather than through the organisation, as the NU has little authority over 
these kyais.44  
The NU only has some authority over kyais who are sitting as 
members of  its local or national leadership boards. Hence it can issue 
sanctions over the head of  the PCNU in Kuningan when he openly defied 
the PBNU’s ban against committing violence against Ahmadi members. 
However, even this authority is limited, as these kyais can still openly defy 
PBNU and issue their own fatwa condemning religious minorities, as can 
be seen in the Sampang incident against the Shiites. As discussed earlier, 
when the PBNU affirmed their beliefs that Shism is not a deviant sect, 
the local NU branch in Sampang and the provincial Eastern Java branch 
issued their own fatwa declaring that it is indeed a deviant sect. As the 
PBNU did not issue further clarifications, these local fatwa remained in 
force, leaving Shiite to be a deviant sect within the East Java province and 
allowing local authorities to provide ill-treatment against known Shiite 
followers, particularly those who lived in Sampang. 
As kyais are self-autonomous, there is a great resistance from 
individual kyai to follow edicts and rules issued by other kyais, even though 
these kyais are technically having a greater rank as PBNU or PCNU 
members. Thus, many kyais often ignore the edicts of  the NU’s leadership 
board, as they believe that at the end of  the day, their santri and ummah 
at the grassroots level, will likely follow and obey their fatwas and other 
teachings. This makes it difficult for the NU to resolve localised incidents 
of  religious violence against Ahmadi and Shiite minorities, as can be 
seen in the cases of  the Kuningan and West Lombok incidents against 
the Ahmadis and the Sampang case against the Shiites, as local kyais and 
local NU leadership boards decided to issue their own condemnations 
against these Muslim minorities, while the national leadership board is 
powerless to prevent such actions. 
F. Concluding Remarks
Utilising insights from new social movement theory, this article has 
highlighted the contradictions between the official theological positions 
of  the Nahdlatul Ulama, issued by both the national leadership board 
44 Ibid.  
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(PBNU) and by senior ulama within the organisation, with the actions 
of  local NU branches (PCNU) and NU-affiliated kyais at local level, 
who often issued their own condemnations against Ahmadi and Shiite 
minorities and sometimes was even directly involved in violent incidents 
and persecutions against these Muslim minorities, specifically in the 
Kuningan and West Lombok incidents against the Ahmadis and the 
Sampang incidents against the Shiites. It argues that such contradictions 
is caused by the decentralised structure of  the organisation, which favors 
local kyais over those of  the PBNU leadership, as ultimate authority at the 
local level rests on these kyais. While the kyais command authority from 
their respective santri and followers, the NU leadership do not have such 
authority. This makes local kyai to have significant influence among their 
followers and have the final say over theological matters, especially over 
controversial issues such as how should one treat religious minorities such 
as Ahmadis and Shiites. Sadly, this often means that local kyais are able 
to exclusivist fatwas that condemn these minorities and encourage their 
followers to commit violence against them, defying PBNU policies that 
urged careful precautions and toleration for these persecuted minorities. 
The decentralised structure of  NU which had worked well for 
the organisation and allowed its activists plenty of  room to maneuver 
to propagate their pro-democracy ideas during the decades of  Suharto’s 
authoritarian rule is now creating a major disadvantage for the 
organisation, as it creates opportunities for local kyais and local NU 
branches to openly defy the national leadership over questions regarding 
religious minorities, resulting in the latter to issue more exclusivist fatwas 
against these minorities. It also create difficulties for the national NU 
leadership to effectively discipline local kyai who had issued provocative 
condemnations against Ahmadi and Shiite minorities and had encouraged 
their followers to conduct violent actions against these groups, as local 
followers tend to accept the authority of  local kyais over that of  PBNU. 
However, the actions of  the local kyais are clearly in conflict with those of  
the NU national leadership, which has clearly stated their condemnations 
against any acts of  violence against these minorities. 
In order to resolve this dilemma, PBNU will face some difficult 
choices, as efforts to create more coherent positions between national 
and local NU leaderships to prevent further violence against these 
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Muslim minorities would create plenty of  conflicts and contestations 
between the national leadership and local ulama, who would have to see 
their authorities eroded over those of  the NU leadership board. The 
local ulama would find it difficult to accept this, as it would have further 
eroded their authority. However, this might be inevitable if  one wishes 
to protect religious minorities, particularly Ahmadi and Shiite minorities, 
against future acts of  violence and persecutions in the future. 
A middle way between PBNU and the local kyais that might be 
used to prevent future incidents of  religious intolerance committed by 
NU clerics and activists is to open better cooperation and collaboration 
between PBNU and the rank-and-file clerics and other NU activists 
to socialize the pluralist theological teachings the NU by the senior 
leadership of  the organisation to the grassroots members of  the 
organization. PBNU can work together with the reputable pesantrens 
within the NU’s schooling system, its affiliated organizations, such as 
its youth wing GP Ansor and its women’s wing Fatayat and Muslimat, 
along with its affiliated think tanks and NGOs, to further promote these 
teachings within the NU community. This could be done by promoting 
more workshop and open discussion session with local ulama and their 
branches about religious minorities and on how one can tolerate their 
presence in spite of  theological differences between the NU and these 
Muslim minority sects, in order to avoid future violent incidents against 
these minorities in the future. 
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